This paper builds an evolutionary model of an industry where firms produce differentiated products. Firms have different average cost functions and different demand functions. Firms are assumed to be totally irrational in the sense that firms enter the industry regardless of the existence of profits; firms' outputs are randomly determined rather than generated from profit maximization problems; and firms exit the industry if their wealth is negative. It shows that without purposive profit maximization assumption, monopolistic competition still evolves in the long run. The only long run survivors are those that possess the most efficient technology, face the most favorable market conditions and produce at their profit maximizing outputs. This paper modifies and supports the classic argument for the derivation of monopolistic competition.
Introduction
The notion of monopolistic competition was invented in responding to the severe limitation in conducting economic analysis using a framework of either pure competition or pure monopoly. Monopolistic competition has elements of both pure competition and pure monopoly. It examines an industry where competing firms produce similar but different commodities. Due to the product differentiation, each firm has a certain degree of monopoly power. This is reflected in firms' downward-slope demand curves.
The free entry and exit condition along with firms' profit maximization behavior leads the industry to long-run zero profits. The corresponding firms' outputs are the ones that maximize their respective profits. In other words, they produce at the tangency point where their demand curves are tangent to their respective average cost curves. Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) both derive this same equilibrium using different techniques. In their derivation of this equilibrium, they both heavily rely on the rationality and purposive profit maximization behavior on firms' part.
However, there are a variety of reasons that firms cannot possibly maximize their profits or profit maximization may not be their objective (see Baumol (1959) , Williamson (1964) , Simon (1979) , Arrow (1986) , Andrews (1949) , and Cyert and March (1963) ).
Without the purposive profit maximization behavior, could monopolistic competition still arrives as a long-run equilibrium? Could the classic argument for the derivation of monopolistic competition still holds?
The early literature (e.g., Alchian (1950) , Enke (1951) , Friedman (1953) ) presents market selection argument to validate profit maximization hypothesis. Alchian (1950) writes "Realized positive profits, not maximum profits, are the mark of success and viability. It does not matter through what process of reasoning or motivation such success was achieved. The fact of its accomplishment is sufficient. This is the criterion by which the economic system selects survivors: those who realize positive profits are the survivors; those who suffer losses disappear.". Enke (1951) presents more details on how the market selection works. Enke (1951) says that "In the long run, however, if firms are in active competition with one another rather than constituting a number of isolated monopolies, natural selection will tend to permit the survival of only those firms that either through good luck or great skill have managed, almost or completely, to optimize their position and earn the normal profits necessary for survival. In these instances the economist can make aggregate predictions as if each and every firm knew how to secure maximum long-run profits.". Friedman (1953) also advocates that "The process of natural selection thus helps to validate the hypothesis (of profit maximization) or, rather, given natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis can be based largely on the judgment that it summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival."
Later, Winter (1964 Winter ( , 1971 , and Nelson and Winter (1982) further examine this market selection argument in the context of retained earnings dynamics. They found that the retained earnings of profit maximizers will grow fastest and eventually those firms will dominate the market. Nelson and Winter (1982) present a partial equilibrium model where prices are fixed and all firms have access to the same technology; it shows that "as if " profit maximization describe the long run steady state of firms' behavior. Dutta and Radner (1999) , and Blume and Easley (2002) examine whether natural selection favors profit maximizing firms in models with added capital market, where firms can grow through retained earnings or through financing in the capital markets. Dutta and Radner (1999) shows that all surviving firms are not profit maximizing firms. Blume and Easley (2002) shows that the market selection favors profit maximizing firms, but the long-run behavior of evolutionary market models is not well described by the equilibrium models based on the profit maximization hypothesis. Luo (1995 Luo ( , 2007 present two evolutionary models of industry dynamics, which support the profit maximization hypothesis through the market selection arguments. Furthermore, in both papers, the long-run behavior of the industries is consistent with the one based on the profit maximization hypothesis. The papers basically says that even though firms are not maximizing their profits (their outputs are randomly determined upon their entry to the industry), natural selection selects for the firms that happen to produce at profit maximizing outputs, which in turn promote rational aggregate market outcomes. Specifically, Luo (1995) examines an industry where all firms produce a homogenous commodity. It formally proves that with firms' total irrationality, perfect competition as a long run equilibrium evolves with the "as if " profit maximizers as the only survivors. Luo (2007) obtains similar conclusion in examining a more complex industry structure where firms produce similar but differentiated products. Namely, the monopolistic competition arrives as a long run outcome where only the "as if" profit maximizers survive. Luo (2007) assumes the symmetric demand function and identical average cost function for all firms. However, this paper builds on these models and assumes the non-symmetric demand function and non-identical average cost function for all firms. Specifically, this paper constructs an evolutionary model of an industry where firms produce similar but differentiated products and each firm has its own inherent demand and average cost function. Firms enter the industry sequentially over time. Each firm's output is randomly determined upon its entry and fixed thereafter.
If a firm realizes a profit, the profit becomes a part of its wealth. If a firm's wealth is positive at the beginning of a period, the firm will continue to produce its product next period; otherwise, the firm exits the industry at the end of that time period. The nonnegative wealth serves as a market selection criterion. This type of modelling strategy completely rules out firms' rationality in their decision of entry to the industry, exit from the industry; and in the determination of the level of their outputs to produce. The paper concludes that with non-symmetric demand function and non-identical average cost function, not all "as if " profit maximizers will survive. The firms producing at their minimum efficient scales will not survive. The only survivors in the long run are the "as if " profit maximizers who possess the most efficient technology and face the most favorable market conditions. In aggregate, monopolistic competition arises in the long run. This paper modifies and supports the classic argument for the derivation of monopolistic competition. In other words, firms' rationality is not needed in achieving monopolistic competition. In addition, the long run survivors produce at a suboptimal level of output (less than their minimum efficient scales). This is consistent with the empirical findings in the industrial organization literature (see Weiss (1963 and 1976) , Scherer (1973) , and Pratten (1971) ) that a majority of firms are not only small but also small enough so as to operate at a suboptimal level of output (instead of the minimum efficient scale) in most industries.
The Model
Consider an industry where firms enter sequentially over time, producing a similar but differentiated products. For simplicity, one firm is assumed to enter the industry each time period. The firm that enters at time period t, where t = 1, 2, ..., is referred to as firm t. Firm i, where i = 1, 2, ..., produces a level of output αQ i , where α is a positive parameter and it reflects the size of the firm relative to the market and where Q i is randomly taken upon entry period from the interval [Q, Q], 0 < Q < Q < +∞.
The demand function for firm i, i = 1, 2, ..., at time t, t ≥ i, is as follows, There is entry cost in the industry. Firm i 0 s average entry cost is assumed to be negative first derivative and a positive second derivative, i.e.,
Furthermore, for given parameters Q * and Q * , where Q * >Q and Q * < Q, there exists a Q
Proof. See Appendix A for the proof.
In addition, this α−transformation ensures that firm i 0 s profit maximizing point Q * i remain the same. This is formally stated in the following proposition.
Firm i's normalized per unit profit at time period t, where t ≥ i ≥ 1, is defined as
Then, the following is true.
Proposition 2 the normalized per unit profit for firm i that produces at αQ * i is maximized, i.e.,
Proof. See Appendix A for the proof. Luo (1995) The following proposition shows that each time period with a strictly positive probability (however small) firms enter with the most efficient technology and facing the best market conditions along with producing at their profit maximizing outputs.
Proposition 3 For any given > 0, there exists a θ ∈ [0, 1] , such that for i = 1, 2, ...,
Proof. See appendix A for the proof.
Remark: Essentially, Proposition 3 says that in each time period, there is a strictly positive probability that a firm enters, producing at the tangency of its average cost curve to its demand curve, having the most efficient technology and facing the best market conditions. In fact, those firms resemble the profit maximizing firms and have the ratio of its profit maximizing average cost to the base intercept of its demand curve being the smallest among all firms producing at tangency points.
A firm's wealth at the end of a time period is defined as an accumulative profits up to the end of that time period. If a firm's wealth at the end of one time period is negative, then this firm must exit the industry at the end of that time period. Otherwise, this firm will continue to produce in the next time period. This assumption serves as a market selection criterion. The detail dynamics of the industry is described in the following.
For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no firm in the industry at the initial time period. At the beginning of time period 1, only one firm (called firm 1) enters the industry, producing αQ 1 of product 1. The price of product 1 at time 1 is P
where S 0 is a set of firms that have entered before time period 1 and are producing in time period 1. By the assumption, S 0 = φ. Hence, the price for product 1 of firm 1 is P
s total entry cost is β 1 kαQ 1 and its average cost is C α (αQ 1 ). It follows that firm 1's profit at time 1 is
s wealth at the end of time period 1 is defined At the beginning of time period 2, another firm (labeled as firm 2) enters the industry, producing αQ 2 of product 2. The price for product 2 at time 2 is P
where S 1 is a set of firms, which entered in time period 1 and are continuing to produce at time 2. Specifically,
entry cost is β 2 kαQ 2 and its average cost is C α (αQ 2 ); hence, firm 2's profit at time 2 is
. Firm 2's wealth at the end of time period 2 is defined
Firm 2 continues to produce αQ 2 of product 2 at time 3 if W 2 2 ≥ 0 and otherwise exits at the end of its entry period 2.
If firm 1 is producing αQ 1 of product 1 at time 2 (i.e., firm 1 has had a nonnegative wealth at time 1), then firm 1 has survived period 1 and continues producing αQ 1 of product 1 in the industry in time period 2. Firm 1's product price at time 2 is
is included from the intercept of firm 1's demand function at time period 2. If firm 1's wealth is nonnegative at the end of time period 1, then firm 1's wealth at the end of time period 2 is defined as an accumulative profits up to the end of time period 2. That is,
Furthermore, firm 1 continues to produce αQ This process goes on and on. In general, at the beginning of time t, one firm (labeled as firm t) enters the industry, producing αQ t of product t. The price of product t at time
where S t−1 is a set of firms, which entered before and in time period t − 1 and are still producing at time t, i.e., S t−1 = {i ≤ t − 1 :
is a set of firms that have survived all time periods up to the end of time period t − 1 and remain in the market at time t. Firm t's total entry cost is β t kαQ t and its average cost is C α (αQ t ); hence, firm t's profit at time t is (P
, then firm i has survived all time periods up to the end of time t − 1 and remains producing αQ i of product i in the industry in time period
Note that the entry firm (i.e., firm t) is included from the intercept of firm i's demand function at time period t. If firm i's wealth is nonnegative at the end of time period t − 1, then firm i's wealth at the end of time period t is defined as an accumulative profits up to the end of time period t. That is,
Furthermore, firm i continues to produce αQ i of product i at time t + 1 if firm i 0 s wealth is nonnegative at time t (i.e., W i t ≥ 0) and otherwise, firm i exits at the end of time period t.
To ensure that all firms producing at arbitrarily close to their profit maximizing outputs can potentially make positive profits upon their entry periods, it is assumed
Otherwise, no such firm can make positive profit upon its entry period and consequently no such firm can survive in the industry for more than one period.
The Results
Under the firm-specific cost curves and the firm-specific demand curves, the following theorem shows that as the size of each firm becomes infinitesimally small relative to the market, as the entry cost becomes sufficiently small, and as time gets sufficiently large, the industry converges in probability to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium, where the only surviving firms are those producing at outputs on their average cost curves tangent to their demand curves, and furthermore at these outputs the ratios of their average costs to the base intercepts of their demand curves are the smallest among all firms producing at tangency outputs. Firms that have such smallest ratios are those having the most efficient technologies and facing the best market conditions. The results are precisely stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For any given positive numbers and η ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive numbers α and k such that, for any α < α and for
(ii) with probability of at least 1 − η, each of the remaining firms, say firm i, is the one with c * i
having the average costs lying in the interval
(iii) with probability of at least 1−η, no new entrant firm, say firm t, with the average cost lying outside the interval [c *
an make positive profit by entry. That is, for firm t, producing αQ t ,
Proof. See Appendix B for the proof.
Remark: Shrinking the α and k represents ways of shrinking the scale of firms relative to the market and shrinking entry costs to zero, respectively. As the α and k get smaller, the industry eventually comes closer to monopolistic competition as time goes by. In would not survive in the long run. According to part (ii), the only surviving firms are those producing at arbitrarily close to the tangency of their average cost curves to their respective demand curves (i.e., resembling profit maximizing firms), and using a technology arbitrarily close to the most efficient technology (with c * ) and serving a market arbitrarily close to the largest market (with A) (i.e., facing the best market conditions). Furthermore, part (iii) indicates that no new entrant firms not producing at arbitrarily close to the tangency output or not having the most efficient technology or not facing the best market conditions, could enter and make positive profits. In addition, it is worth mentioning that in the process of shrinking the α and k, the k must be maintained to be sufficiently high relative to the scale of parameter α. This is reflected in the lower bound,
, for the k. Otherwise, the entry cost loses its role of creating entry barriers to the industry.
Furthermore, the results in Theorem 1 suggest that the long run survivors are producing at a suboptimal scale of their outputs in the sense that their output levels are less than their minimum efficient scales. This is consistent with the well documented empirical findings in the industrial organization literature (see Weiss (1963 and 1976) , Scherer (1973) , and Pratten (1971) ) that a majority of firms are not only small but also sufficiently small so as to operate at a suboptimal scale of output (instead of the minimum efficient scale) in most industries.
Conclusion
This paper builds a dynamic model of an industry where firms produce similar but differentiated products. Firms have different entry costs and average cost functions as well. Firms face different demand functions.
Conventionally, to achieve monopolistic competition, the key driving force is that firms are assumed to maximize profits in their entry decision, in selecting output level and in their decision of when to exit the industry (see Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) ). However, due to the recent criticism on firms' rationality, this paper attempts to explain monopolistic competition without purposive profit maximization assumption. This is achieved by applying an evolutionary idea of natural selection to the industry competition. Firms enter the industry regardless of the existence of profits; firms' outputs are randomly determined rather than generated from profit maximization problems;
and firms exit the industry if their wealth is negative.
A group of papers in this literature provide positive support to the hypothesis of the "as if" profit maximizers as long run survivors through market selection argument. This paper shows that not all of these firms will survive in this general setting of industry.
The only long run survivors are those that possess the most efficient technology, face the most favorable market conditions and produce at their profit maximizing outputs. Moreover, at the aggregate level, monopolistic competition arises in the long run. This paper modifies and supports the classic argument for the derivation of monopolistic competition. In addition, the results in this paper is consistent with the common observation in the industrial organization that a majority of the firms are not only small but also sufficiently small so as to operate at suboptimal scale of output (instead of the minimum efficient scale) in most industries. (2) Rewrite equation (4) into the following:
then taking a derivative of the above equation and then applying equation (2 ) results in the following equation: where is any given small positive number. It is also true that C i (αQ i ) has a strictly positive support at c * . Finally, since A i has a strictly positive support at A, and given the fact that A i is independent of all the random variables a i , c * i , Q i , and C i (·) and given the α−transformation of the average cost function, it follows that with a strictly positive probability,
Furthermore, given that the sequences {a
independently and identically distributed, respectively; since Q i is independent of a j , c * j and C j (·) for i, j = 1, 2, ...; the a i is independent of c * j for all i and j; and the C i (·) is independent of a j and c * j for i 6 = j, it follows that there must exists a θ ∈ (0, 1) , such that for i = 1, 2, ..., Pr
Theorem 1 is directly established by using the results in two lemmas, namely, Lemma . Therefore, firm i 0 s demand function can be expressed, in terms of q i , as follows:
Similarly, firm i 0 s average cost function can also be expressed, in terms of q i , as
In addition, for any given α, ∂c
for any i = 1, 2, ... This means that the slope of a firm's tangent line to its average cost function at the output level of αq * i is the same across all firms.
Furthermore, normalize the following variables by A i . That is, define, for i = 1, 2, ...,
A and e β = β A . Hence, each firm's demand function in terms of e p i t (αq i ) has the same base intercept.
For t = 1, 2, ..., define I t t as the following:
If I t t = 1, then firm t makes a nonnegative profit on the entry period.
Lemma 1 establishes a lower bound for firms' prices after shrinking firms' size relative to the market (i.e., α). The lower bounds are arbitrarily close to c * ( which is the tangency of the most efficient firms' average cost curves to their respective demand curves).
Denote S t = {t} ∪ S t−1 for t = 1, 2, ....
Lemma 1
For any given k, for any given positive 0 <
A βk 2
, there exists an α such that, for α < α, at any time period t, where t = 1, 2, ..., for i ∈ S t ,
Proof. Define
Lemma 1 first proves the following claim.
Claim: For any given k, and for any given positive 0 <
, there exists an α 1 such that for α < α 1 , e b P t ≥ e c * + αe q * + e βk − , for all t = 1, 2, ....
Proof of Claim:
This is shown by induction.
(1) The base step of the induction proof: The claim is true for t = 1. For any given k, and for any given positive 0 <
A βk 2
, define α 1 such that
Since
). This together with equation (8) and q 1 ≤ q and
(2) The induction step: Suppose that the claim is true for t = r, i.e., for any given k, and for any given positive 0 <
, there exists an α 1 such that for α < α 1 , at time period r, e b P r ≥ e c * + αe q
It is now shown that the claim is true for t = r + 1, i.e., for the given k, for the given
, if α < α 1 , then at time period r + 1,
Using equation (7),
where X r+1 represents a set of firms that exit the industry at the end of time period r + 1. Equation (11) further implies that
Consider the following two cases:
Then, using the fact that e c * r+1 ≥ e c * , and e q * r+1 ≥ e q * , equation (12) implies that
That is, equation (10) holds.
Case 2: Suppose that
Notice that
Using the definition of e b P r (see equation (7)),
Equations (14) and (15) imply that
Since, using the definition of α 1 in equation (8),
This together with equation (16) further implies that for α < α 1 ,
Using equations (13) and (17), it follows that for α < α 1 ,
Since properties (3) of the α-transformed cost function outlined in Proposition 1 in Appendix A imply that any price for producing αQ r+1 on the demand curve which is tangent to the average cost curve at αQ * r+1 is no higher than C r+1 α (αQ r+1 ), equation (18), together with A r+1 e β ≤ β r+1 , implies that
Equation (19) further implies that firm r + 1 makes a negative profit in its entry period.
Therefore, firm r + 1 must exit the industry at the end of its entry period r + 1. That is,
Using equation (12), this in turn implies that
which together with equation (9) further implies that for any α < α 1 ,
Therefore, the claim holds. Now, at time period t = 1, 2, ..., for any firm i ∈ S t = {t} ∪ S t−1 ,
This together with the result of the claim and with q t ≤ q implies that for any α < α 1 ,
Then, with 0 <
, there exists an α < α 1 such that for α < α,
Therefore, the result of Lemma 1 follows from equation (20) and (21).¥ Lemma 2 establishes a probabilistic upper bound for firms' prices after a certain time period for a sufficiently small α. The upper bounds are arbitrarily close to the average cost plus average entry cost of the firms producing at the tangency of their average cost curves to their respective demand curves, possessing the most efficient technology, and facing the best market conditions. The driving force of this result is the allowance for the entry of firms producing at the tangency of their average cost curves to their respective demand curves, with the most efficient technology (i.e., c * ) and facing the best market conditions (i.e., A ). In other words, it is indirectly assumed that each time period with a positive probability (however small) firms enter the industry with the most efficient technology (i.e., c * ) and facing the best market conditions (i.e., A ). These firms are referred to as M-firms in the proof of Lemma 2. The proof of Lemma 2 is done by way of contradiction. It roughly says that the prices cannot be above the upper bounds after a certain time period for a sufficiently small α. If they do, then there will be a sufficiently large number of M-firms entering the industry over the time periods where the prices are above the upper bounds. Since these M-firms make positive profits in their entry periods and in all subsequent time periods, they never exits the industry. Over time, the presence of the sufficiently large number of M-firms in the industry will drive all prices below their lower bounds defined in Lemma 1. This is a contradiction.
Denote q = (q 1 , q 2 , ...) and Q = (Q 1 , Q 2 , ...).
Lemma 2 With probability 1, the following occurs: for any given k, and for any given
, there exists an α, such that, for any α < α, there exists a time period Pr (M t = 1) = θ and Pr (M t = 0) = 1 − θ for t = 1, 2, ...
The firm with M t = 1 is referred to as a M−firm.
The proof begins by proving the following claim and the result in Lemma 2 follows directly from this claim.
Claim: With probability 1, there is only a finite number of time periods, in which e b P t is above e c * + αe q
where for any t > 1, the random variable h t is defined to be 1 if at time t − 1, e b P t−1 is above e c * + αe q * + e βk + 
Now, construct a collection of random variables { f
where, for i = 1, 2, ..., N(m), t i = min t {t : h t = 1, t > t i−1 , t 0 = 0} according to
Since for i = 1, 2, ..., N(m), M t i is independent of h t i (which is realized at t i − 1) and since {M t } t≥1 is independently and identically distributed, it follows that { f
is independently and identically distributed and furthermore, in each time period, M t and f M t have the same distribution function. This together with equation (22) implies that,
.
Denote
. Using Chebyshev's inequality, for any given positive
This together with the fact that Pr
Notice that as N(m) → ∞, Z N(m) → ∞ and
Hence, for any given positive integer x and for any given positive y < 1, there exists a positive integer N,
Define m, such that N(m) = N. Since
follows that for m > m,
Using Proposition 4 in Appendix C, equation (27) also implies that
Set J = N in equation (24) . Equation (24) means that for this given N, there exists a
Since for m > max(m 0 , m),
, (using equations (28)and (29) ).
The above means that for any given positive integer x and for any given positive y < 1,
This further implies that
This means that with a strictly positive probability the number of M-firms goes to infinity. Now, if M t i = 1, then the firm that enters at time t i , where h t i = 1, is a M-firm.
Consider this M-firm. When h t i = 1, this implies that at time t i − 1, e b
. This, together with the property that for a M-firm e c * +
This further implies that p 
Hence, this M-firm makes a strictly positive profit in its entry time period and it continues to produce in time period t i + 1. Lemma 1 implies that for this k and 0 and for any α < α, this M-firm in any subsequent time periods has its product price greater than per unit cost (which is no more than c * + 0 ) . In other words, this M-firm makes a strictly positive profit in any subsequent time period after its entry. Therefore, this M-firm never exits the economy. Equation (30) implies that with a strictly positive probability there is an infinite number of such M-firms in the economy. Since those M-firms never exit the economy and since each individual M-firm produces at least αQ , the presence of the infinite number of such M-firms would drive the price for each of the producing firms, say firm i, below
with a strictly positive probability. This contradicts the result in Lemma 1. Therefore, equation (23) Then, it follows that with probability 1, the following occurs: for any given positive , there exist positive numbers k and α such that, for 2A β(2A+A) < k < k and for α < α, there exists a time period τ ( , Q, α, k) such that for t > τ( , Q, α, k), < k < k, there exists a time period τ ( , η, α, k) such that, for all t > τ( , η, α, k),
Combining equations (32) 
